Categoría: Artículos

To the red country and part of the gray country of Oklahoma, the last rains came gently, and they did not cut the scarred earth. The plows crossed and recrossed the rivulet marks. The last rains lifted the corn quickly and scattered weed colonies and grass along the sides of the roads so that the gray country and the dark red country began to disappear under a green cover.

In the last part of May the sky grew pale and the clouds that had hung in high puffs for so long in the spring were dissipated. The sun flared down on the growing corn day after day until a line of brown spread along the edge of each green bayonet. The clouds appeared, and went away, and in a while they did not try any more. The weeds grew darker green to protect themselves, and they did not spread any more. The surface of the earth crusted, a thin hard crust, and as the sky became pale, so the earth became pale, pink in the red country and white in the gray country.

In the water-cut gullies the earth dusted down in dry little streams. Gophers and ant lions started small avalanches. And as the sharp sun struck day after day, the leaves of the young corn became less stiff and erect; they bent in a curve at first, and then, as the central ribs of strength grew weak, each leaf tilted downward. Then it was June, and the sun shone more fiercely. The brown lines on the corn leaves widened and moved in on the central ribs. The weeds frayed and edged back toward their roots. The air was thin and the sky more pale; and every day the earth paled.

In the roads where the teams moved, where the wheels milled the ground and the hooves of the horses beat the ground, the dirt crust broke and the dust formed. Every moving thing lifted the dust into the air: a walking man lifted a thin layer as high as his waist, and a wagon lifted the dust as high as the fence tops, and an automobile boiled a cloud behind it. The dust was long in settling back again.

When June was half gone, the big clouds moved up out of Texas and the Gulf, high heavy clouds, rain-heads. The men in the fields looked up at the clouds and sniffed at them and held wet fingers up to sense the wind. And the horses were nervous while the clouds were up. The rain-heads dropped a little spattering and hurried on to some other country. Behind them the sky was pale again and the sun flared. In the dust there were drop craters where the rain had fallen, and there were clean splashes on the corn, and that was all.

A gentle wind followed the rain clouds, driving them on northward, a wind that softly clashed the drying corn. A day went by and the wind increased, steady, unbroken by gusts. The dust from the roads fluffed up and spread out and fell on the weeds beside the fields, and fell into the fields a little way. Now the wind grew strong and hard and it worked at the rain crust in the corn fields. Little by little the sky was darkened by the mixing dust, and the wind felt over the earth, loosened the dust, and carried it away. The wind grew stronger. The rain crust broke and the dust lifted up out of the fields and drove gray plumes into the air like sluggish smoke. The corn threshed the wind and made a dry, rushing sound. The finest dust did not settle back to earth now, but disappeared into the darkening sky.

The wind grew stronger, whisked under stones, carried up straws and old leaves, and even little clods, marking its course as it sailed across the fields. The air and the sky darkened and through them the sun shone redly, and there was a raw sting in the air. During a night the wind raced faster over the land, dug cunningly among the rootlets of the corn, and the corn fought the wind with its weakened leaves until the roots were freed by the prying wind and then each stalk settled wearily sideways toward the earth and pointed the direction of the wind.

The dawn came, but no day. In the gray sky a red sun appeared, a dim red circle that gave a little light, like dusk; and as that day advanced, the dusk slipped back toward darkness, and the wind cried and whimpered over the fallen corn.

Men and women huddled in their houses, and they tied handkerchiefs over their noses when they went out, and wore goggles to protect their eyes.

When the night came again it was black night, for the stars could not pierce the dust to get down, and the window lights could not even spread beyond their own yards. Now the dust was evenly mixed with the air, an emulsion of dust and air. Houses were shut tight, and cloth wedged around doors and windows, but the dust came in so thinly that it could not be seen in the air, and it settled like pollen on the chairs and tables, on the dishes. The people brushed it from their shoulders. Little lines of dust lay at the door sills.

In the middle of that night the wind passed on and left the land quiet. The dust-filled air muffled sound more completely than fog does. The people, lying in their beds, heard the wind stop. They awakened when the rushing wind was gone. They lay quietly and listened deep into the stillness. Then the roosters crowed, and their voices were muffled, and the people stirred restlessly in their beds and wanted the morning. They knew it would take a long time for the dust to settle out of the air. In the morning the dust hung like fog, and the sun was as red as ripe new blood. All day the dust sifted down from the sky, and the next day it sifted down. An even blanket covered the earth. It settled on the corn, piled up on the tops of the fence posts, piled up on the wires; it settled on roofs, blanketed the weeds and trees.

The people came out of their houses and smelled the hot stinging air and covered their noses from it. And the children came out of the houses, but they did not run or shout as they would have done after a rain. Men stood by their fences and looked at the ruined corn, drying fast now, only a little green showing through the film of dust. The men were silent and they did not move often. And the women came out of the houses to stand beside their men—to feel whether this time the men would break. The women studied the men’s faces secretly, for the corn could go, as long as something else remained. The children stood near by, drawing figures in the dust with bare toes, and the children sent exploring senses out to see whether men and women would break. The children peeked at the faces of the men and women, and then drew careful lines in the dust with their toes. Horses came to the watering troughs and nuzzled the water to clear the surface dust. After a while the faces of the watching men lost their bemused perplexity and became hard and angry and resistant. Then the women knew that they were safe and that there was no break. Then they asked, What’ll we do? And the men replied, I don’t know. But it was all right. The women knew it was all right, and the watching children knew it was all right. Women and children knew deep in themselves that no misfortune was too great to bear if their men were whole. The women went into the houses to their work, and the children began to play, but cautiously at first. As the day went forward the sun became less red. It flared down on the dust-blanketed land. The men sat in the doorways of their houses; their hands were busy with sticks and little rocks. The men sat still—thinking—figuring.

“I was born in New York in 1919. My grandparents had a farm up upstate, and that’s what I remember, camping out in the barn and going swimming in the local brook. I put up a teepee out in the cow pasture. I had to put a fence around it so the cows didn’t break it down. I was a big fan of Native Americans. Did you ever hear of Ernest Thompson Seton? He wrote books about Native Americans. He said, “If you want to have role models, don’t go to Europe. Right here were men who were strong and women who were strong, and they cooperated. If there was food, everybody shared; if there was no food, everybody, including the chief and his family, were hungry.” And that seemed to be the way people should live.”

– Pete Seeger

“Pete Seeger did so much for the world through music, in ways both subtle and big. You know, heaven must be a great place, because there are a lot of people going there!” – Buffy Sainte-Marie

Today is Indigenous Peoples’ Day!

Indigenous Peoples’ Day is celebrated on the second Monday of October to honor the cultures and histories of the Native American people.

With this in mind, let’s take a moment to celebrate Buffy Sainte-Marie!

Buffy Sainte-Marie is a Canadian-American Cree singer-songwriter, musician, composer, visual artist, educator, pacifist and social activist. Throughout her career in all of these areas, her work has focused on issues of indigenous peoples of the Americas. Her singing and writing repertoire also includes subjects of love, war, religion, and mysticism.

In 1997, Buffy founded the Cradleboard Teaching Project, an educational curriculum devoted to better understanding Native Americans. She has won recognition and many awards and honors for both her music and her work in education and social activism.

Her 19th album, “Medicine Songs” (2017), features a mix of new material, such as “You Got to Run (Spirit of the Wind),” a collaboration with Tanya Tagaq, and re-recorded older songs, including “Starwalker,” “Little Wheel Spin and Spin” and “Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee.” The album drew positive reviews and went on to win the 2018 Juno Award for Indigenous Music Album of the Year.

Of the album, “NOW” magazine’s Michael Rancic wrote:

“Another artist might show signs of disappointment or uncertainty when faced with the notion that not much has changed in half a century, but on “Medicine Songs”, in the face of the unchanging nature of the oppression she’s expressed through her music, Buffy Sainte-Marie has chosen to be just as determined, unflinching and constant in her own art.”

In the video below, Buffy Sainte-Marie and Tanya Tagaq perform «You Got to Run (Spirit of the Wind)». The song was written by Sainte-Marie and inspired by champion dogsled racer George Attla, who competed in the first-ever Iditarod dog sled race in 1973 and was the subject of the 1979 film, “Spirit of the Wind”.

The film shows the life of George Attla as a young Athabaskan trapper living in the bush in Alaska and then in a TB sanitarium in town. He comes home with a fused knee too much cross cultural conflict, and goes on to find his way as a dog sled driver.

You Got to Run (Spirit of the Wind)

Whether you’re woman or whether you’re man

Sometimes you got to take a stand

Just because you think you can

You got to run, you got to run . . .

Click the link below to experience the power and wonder of the “Spirit of the Wind”.

No hablamos de decadencia, pues ésta empezó hacia 1914 y se puede dar por terminada en los inicios del siglo XXI, sino de debacle, de desastre, de catástrofe y disolución. La decadencia tiene períodos brillantes y su declinar puede ser lento; los instantes de ilusorio poder o de frustrada recuperación emiten señales engañosas de que la vieja potencia sigue viva, de que el eclipse es ficticio; el mejor ejemplo de ello sería la Francia de los primeros años de la V República (1958-1968) o el  Milagro   alemán de los cincuenta. Sin embargo, en la debacle ya no hay resplandores del pasado: todo es sombra, mediocridad y malos auspicios, como la Roma del siglo V o el Bizancio de los Paleólogos.

Europa ya no es decadente porque no le queda espacio por el que caer. El momento actual es de postrimerías, de degradación y de un curioso tipo de barbarie que viene envuelto entre avances tecnológicos deshumanizadores y un sentimentalismo histérico, EUNUCOIDE, femenino, obsesionado por frivolidades pero increíblemente ciego ante los grandes problemas. Si algo ha hecho la crisis de Ucrania, es desvelar este período terminal.

¿Cuáles son las causas?

El régimen colonial americano. La conducta de los gobiernos europeos —en especial el comunitario de Bruselas y los “nacionales” de Berlín y París— evidencia hasta qué punto Europa es una dócil colonia yanqui, a un nivel, el del patio trasero, que sólo alcanzaron la Cuba de Batista y la Nicaragua de Somoza. Se ha sacrificado el sector esencial de la economía europea, la industria alemana, sin una sola voz de protesta ni entre los dirigentes germanos ni, por supuesto, entre los chupatintas de Bruselas. La voladura de los gaseoductos Nord Stream 1 y 2 demuestra que Alemania no es un Estado soberano sino un mero espacio mercantil e industrial. Lo que habría sido un casus belli para cualquier potencia medianamente digna, se volvió vergonzoso acto de sumisión y entrega incondicional ante un amo, del que todos sabemos que ha destruido esas estructuras esenciales para la provisión estratégica de energía en Europa, no sólo en Alemania. Además, el protector y aliado de Europa tuvo a bien regocijarse en medios institucionales, por boca de Victoria Nuland, de la destrucción de los gaseoductos, sin temor a ninguna demanda de explicaciones por su apoyo evidente a lo que es un acto de terrorismo.

Durante esta crisis, el control de Francia sobre el Sahel se ha disipado en cuestión de meses, en especial en Níger, junto con Rusia y Kazajstán uno de los principales proveedores de uranio a la industria nuclear francesa, que es el principal fabricante de electricidad en Europa. El amigo americano, por medio otra vez de la eurófoba Victoria Nuland, dejó a París —y a Europa— en la estacada y negoció por cuenta propia con el nuevo gobierno revolucionario de Niamey. Nada nuevo bajo el sol, ya hicieron lo mismo con franceses e ingleses en Suez (1956); en Indochina (1945 -1955) y Argelia (1956-1962), con Francia y en el Sáhara con España (1975-1976)

Peor aún, el eje franco-alemán ha demostrado su debilidad al ser incapaz de frenar la política belicista de un satélite americano, Gran Bretaña, que saboteó una salida negociada al conflicto del Donbass y manipuló a Polonia y los países bálticos, miembros de la Unión Europea, sin que Berlín y París fueran capaces de frenar a los ingleses. Para mayor escarnio, Francia y Alemania se supone que son los países dirigentes de la Unión Europea, mientras que Gran Bretaña se encuentra fuera de la Unión.

En realidad, los europeos no se pueden quejar de ninguna deslealtad americana. Cuando se acepta ser peón, se corre el riesgo de ser sacrificado en cualquier jugada. América defiende sus intereses y juega su partida.

Desindustrialización. Hace treinta años, la Unión Europea decidió transformar a la que fue la primera economía industrial del mundo, al continente pionero en la fabricación de objetos en masa, en una economía especulativa y mercantil, centrada en el sector de los servicios. Europa cada vez produce menos objetos reales y ya no es el taller del mundo. Se ha apostado por la alta tecnología, las energías limpias y el comercio. La crisis de Ucrania ha demostrado los peligros de semejante decisión: los países que han mantenido su industria, como Rusia, China o la pequeña Corea del Norte, pueden producir armamento de una manera continuada y masiva, mientras que las potencias desindustrializadas de Occidente, que han limitado su poder manufacturero, que producen armas muy sofisticadas y caras, no pueden casi hacer frente a las necesidades de abastecimiento de Ucrania en un conflicto bélico a gran escala, que no es la típica expedición colonial del castigo de la OTAN. La industria de armamento en Occidente es privada y obedece a intereses particulares, uno de ellos es la obtención de beneficios por sus accionistas: cuanto más caro se pueda vender el producto, mejor. Para ello debe haber una gran variedad de oferta en el mercado y una cantidad exorbitante de innovaciones tecnológicas que hagan el objeto vendible. En los países del eje eurasiático la industria de armamento está intervenida por el Estado e invierte sus recursos en productos prácticos, baratos y manejables, capaces de poder demostrar su eficacia en una guerra a gran escala. La decisión de lo que se produce viene del Estado, no se le impone por la iniciativa privada.

En Occidente la sanidad, la educación o la defensa son, ante todo, negocios privados de los que la administración estatal es cliente. Los productos de la industria militar presentan las mismas características de los que se ofertan en el mercado liberal: pueden ser de gran sofisticación, pero la necesidad a la que obedecen es dudosa. El fracaso del armamento OTAN en un escenario tan exigente como Ucrania, en una guerra de consumo masivo de recursos y de igualdad entre los dos bandos, cuando no de clara superioridad rusa, ha demostrado lo errónea que ha sido la decisión de debilitar el tejido industrial clásico en Europa.

La garantía básica para la existencia de un Estado es su capacidad para la defensa, para disuadir o derrotar a un posible enemigo. Europa no puede hacerlo porque carece de la estructura necesaria para ello, depende de manera absoluta de los productos del complejo armamentístico americano. Sin la autosuficiencia militar, que viene dada por la capacidad de producción de la industria propia, no es posible ejercer la soberanía.

El régimen oligárquico. Lo que se llama democracia en Occidente es un mero disfraz de la plutocracia. El sufragio universal está completamente adulterado por las campañas de marketing que se hacen para colocar a un candidato prediseñado en el gobierno. Esta publicidad es tan extremadamente cara que, sin el concurso económico de los financieros, es casi imposible que una opción política alcance el poder. Quien paga, manda. Y basta con ver la uniformidad de los gobernantes europeos para comprobar que un mismo tipo humano, el gerente, está siendo colocado en la cúspide de un poder estatal que es cada vez más insignificante. Una nación puede soportar un gobierno de mediocres e ineptos porque la dirección política guarda sólo una apariencia de poder, es sólo el brazo estatal de las grandes corporaciones.

El dinero gobierna sin límites, contrapesos ni control:es eso a lo que se llama los mercados, entidades caprichosas e inalcanzables, no humanas, que deciden el curso de la historia como antes lo hacían los dioses olímpicos. La reducción del poder estatal a un mero repartidor de subsidios y contratos, a un espacio de derechos, reduce la soberanía nacional a un mero fantasma, a un flatus vocis. Y sólo el Estado puede garantizar la sumisión al interés general de los intereses particulares. Es la muy olvidada teoría del bien común. El poder impersonal de las grandes corporaciones resulta incompatible, por su propia naturaleza, con toda soberanía popular. Y, además, es apátrida.

La inconsciencia europea. La existencia de la Unión Europea debería promover una conciencia nacional europea; sin embargo, esta institución se ha encargado de sofocar cualquier brote de nacionalismo en su seno. Para la burocracia de Bruselas, Europa no es una potencia geopolítica con sus propios designios estratégicos y su soberanía, sino un mercado, un club financiero, una lonja en la que todo se compra, se vende y se interviene. En todo lo demás, la Unión Europea es la rama mercantil de la OTAN, el brazo ejecutivo militar del colonialismo anglosajón. Bruselas tiene muy claro su papel ancilar frente a Estados Unidos y su carácter de ariete frente al bloque eurasiático que forman China y Rusia. La sumisión es de tal orden que, como hemos visto en los últimos meses, llega hasta el suicidio económico, y eso que el dinero se configuró como la razón esencial de la Unión Europea. A esto se le denomina, y con razón, vínculo (del latín vinculum: atadura, cadena, grillete) transatlántico.

La servil actitud de las que antaño fueran grandes potencias europeas es muy parecida a la de los rajás indios o de los régulos africanos frente a los funcionarios británicos. Esto sólo se produce por la total falta de conciencia nacional, de una idea de Europa, entre los propios europeos. Ahora mismo, en la situación actual, nuestro continente es un mero objeto de la historia: al anular su voluntad y subordinarse a otra potencia, se convierte en el instrumento de un designio ajeno. Todo esto hubiera sido impensable hace cincuenta años, cuando la conciencia nacional y el sentimiento comunitario y patriótico todavía se albergaban en muchos corazones.

La Unión Europea ha sabido sustituir el patriotismo por el nihilismo hedonista de la sociedad de consumo, ha desarrollado una serie de ideologías de sustitución  (ecologismo, género, animalismo…) que han aniquilado las dos conciencias necesarias para el desarrollo de cualquier nacionalidad independiente: la de clase y la de identidad  Hoy, el ciudadano europeo es más influyente como consumidor que como votante, no cabe mejor ejemplo del extremo de alienación al que se ha llegado.

Los años de la Guerra Fría han pasado y ya no necesitamos que nadie nos defienda  del comunismo. Ni de nada. Europa todavía es lo suficientemente rica y desarrollada como para poder defenderse a sí misma sin el concurso de una gran potencia que, vistos sus “éxitos” en Vietnam, Afganistán, la China nacionalista o Corea, tampoco es muy eficaz a la hora de ejercer su poder militar. Hay más opciones que la sumisión incondicional a los Estados Unidos: desde la asociación con Rusia a los lazos con China, Brasil o la India, que ya son grandes potencias. Incluso — ¿por qué no?— llegar a una alianza con los Estados Unidos en pie de igualdad, como aliados y no como vasallos. Por supuesto, semejante política implica un cambio de mentalidad, el abandono del vacío moral en el que se embrutece a los pueblos de Europa y una voluntad política antiliberal, marcada por el retorno del poder estatal y la conversión del club financiero de Bruselas en una gran potencia con voluntad de decisión política.

Asombra ver que hoy, cuando Europa está más aparentemente unida que nunca, los europeos cuenten menos en el mundo que cuando estaban divididos en estados rivales. El tiempo nos urge a actuar revolucionariamente, porque toda una civilización se está desmoronando bajo el yugo colonial yanqui y el hedonismo nihilista, el peor opio del pueblo. Las opciones para sobrevivir a la catástrofe empiezan a ser tan limitadas como las de Roma en el año 400. Puede que a la vieja Europa no le queden ni dos generaciones de vida.

Non esitiamo a definire l’attacco di Hamas come terrorista e barbaro. Uccidere a sangue freddo civili o sequestrarli, offendere i vinti, devastare i corpi delle donne.

E di chi non è della tua religione, non corrisponde ad alcun principio di liberazione e nemmeno di guerra asimmetrica; al contrario, per la sua efferatezza, rischia di legittimare l’oppressione che si vorrebbe combattere e di alimentare nuovo odio. E non c’è bisogno di ricordare il dolore di nostri interlocutori e collaboratori che in questo momento piangono cari e amici uccisi, per provare orrore. L’unica vera ideologia che sembra sorreggere questo crimine è la «vendetta», così la chiamano, per «l’usurpazione dei luoghi sacri di Al Aqsa», a cui i palestinesi associano i torti, le umiliazioni, le uccisioni subite da chi da decenni sta chiuso nella Striscia di Gaza, definita non a torto «prigione a cielo aperto» per più di due milioni di persone, un orrore esistenziale quotidiano – il manifesto titolò il 7 aprile 2018 Poligono di tiro quando l’esercito israeliano mirava ai corpi di giovani palestinesi indifesi.

Ora si avvia l’operazione militare di Israele che, dalle parole di Netanyahu, anch’essa è motivata dalla «vendetta». Mentre si sprecano gli esempi con l’11 settembre, varrebbe invece la pena ricordare le guerre scellerate che produsse, in Afghanistan – anche quella per «vendetta dell’11 settembre, non per la democrazia afghana» dichiarò Biden nell’estate 2021 del drammatico ritiro Usa-Nato -, e poi in Iraq per le armi di distruzione di massa che non c’erano. Ma l’odio e le distruzioni provocate hanno intanto motivato altro odio, altra vendetta e altro integralismo religioso.

Ma come rispondiamo alla domanda sulla sorpresa? Su come sia stato possibile tutto questo per un rodato e costosissimo apparato di sicurezza riconosciuto come inviolabile nel mondo? Israele si scopre vulnerabile, dov’era l’apparato d’intelligence – e quello Usa anch’esso violato?

Semplicemente non c’era, perché le forze di sicurezza israeliana da mesi sono impegnate nella repressione interna dei Territori palestinesi occupati dove dall’inizio del solo 2023 i morti palestinesi sono 206 e dove è nata una pericolosa stagione che vede i giovani armarsi. Giacché la questione palestinese non è nata 48 ore fa, ma almeno dal 1967 con l’occupazione di Gaza e della Cisgiordania da parte dell’esercito israeliano, che dura tutt’ora in violazione del diritto internazionale e di due Risoluzioni Onu. Nel silenzio della comunità internazionale che l’ha lasciata marcire dopo il ‘95, quando un estremista ebreo uccise Rabin firmatario di Oslo, e con l’uscita di scena – ucciso anche lui – di Yasser Arafat.

Da allora è stato buio sulla Palestina e su un intero popolo, senza diritti, chiuso da muri -: nel suo ultimo libro Patrie Timothy Garton Ash lamenta tra l’altro la nascita di tanti muri dopo il crollo del Muro di Berlino: ecco, il primo è stato proprio il Muro di Sharon che taglia n due la terra palestinese. E poi ancora diviso da reticolati e check point, impedito nel lavoro e nella coltivazione, con la sua acqua e la sua terra rubate quotidianamente; e con la fine della continuità territoriale di uno Stato palestinese auspicato dalla pace di Oslo.

E questo per le centinaia e centinaia di insediamenti ebraici promossi dai governi israeliani che hanno mobilitato i coloni, legati politicamente ad una destra integralista religiosa che in Israele chi è sceso in piazza contro Netanyahu non esita a definire «fascista». Di quella pace sono rimaste solo le riprese televisive. E il tanto annunciato da Trump – e continuato da Biden -, patto di Abramo tra Israele e la «democratica» Arabia Saudita, ha come grave corollario il riconoscimento da parte Usa di tutta Gerusalemme, in parte occupata, come capitale d’Israele, passando sopra gli interessi dei palestinesi e dell’Anp.

Insomma un patto sulla Palestina ma senza i palestinesi. Così è cresciuta una protesta diffusa della società palestinese. Ma la tragedia non è finita: colonne di carri armati si muovono per assediarla verso Gaza, già senza cibo, luce e soccorsi, ma anche verso la Cisgiordania. Si muove la flotta Usa nel Mediterraneo. E si propone la pericolosa «protezione» dell’Iran.

Così il rischio evidente è che le gesta terroriste di Hamas alla fine un risultato l’avranno: seppellire definitivamente la questione palestinese, i diritti democratici e laici di un popolo intero – il popolo dei campi profughi del Medio Oriente – che, delegittimato nelle sue aspettative di vita e di pace, accetta pur subendola la leadership di Hamas, nato apposta per indebolire Al Fatah e nemico giurato della sinistra palestinese, ma che nel 2006 vinse le elezioni anche in Cisgiordania. Vorrebbe dire mettere una pietra tombale, così come tutto il mondo ha fatto finora. Eppure smemorato l’Occidente, compresa l’Ue che non ha fatto nulla per la pace, condanna ma non si ritiene responsabile.

Le sirene che mi hanno svegliato ieri mattina erano accompagnate dalle concitate notizie che alla radio parlavano di forze armate entrate in Israele. Cercare di decifrare ciò che la radio diceva, era parte della cosa più importante: sapere cosa stava succedendo a familiari e amici. Molto presto la mattina, le mie nipoti sembravano liete di trovarsi in una stanza protetta che rende la vita un po’ più sicura in caso di attacco, mentre al sud un’amica mi diceva di sentirsi terrorizzata.

Si trovava nella sua stanza blindata, con la porta ben chiusa, ma senza sapere se le voci che si sentivano provenire dael resto della casa fossero di soldati israeliani o di palestinesi. A Sderot, una città a tre chilometri dal college nel quale ho insegnato negli ultimi 25 anni, i palestinesi sono entrati nella stazione di polizia e hanno ucciso tutti i presenti, poliziotti o civili, vittime che si sono aggiunte ad altri che sono stati uccisi o presi in ostaggio. Più tardi mi è stato comunicato che l’intera famiglia di uno dei nostri studenti è stata massacrata. Una delle nostre insegnanti si sta riprendendo a fatica dal trauma dell’attacco al suo kibbutz vicino alla Striscia di Gaza.

Al momento in cui scriviamo in questo sabato sera si parla di 150 morti, civili o membri delle forze armate, e di circa 1000 feriti. Decine di israeliani, soldati e civili, fatti prigionieri e portati nella Striscia di Gaza. È probabile che queste cifre tragiche aumentino nelle prossime ore.

Mentre le sirene di allarme ci avvertivano di oltre 2200 missili lanciati soprattutto verso la parte meridionale del paese, radio e televisione trasmettevano il timore che attacchi missilistici diffusissimi e distruttivi avrebbero presto colpito l’intero paese. L’ombra degli Hezbollah libanesi e forse dell’Iran si profilava più grande che mai.

La redazione consiglia:

Israele svela l’incontro a Roma con la Libia. Biden furioso, Tripoli brucia

Di fronte all’enorme numero di vittime fra soldati e civili, oltre agli ostaggi a Gaza, lo stupore: come è possibile essere stati presi così alla sprovvista? I migliori servizi segreti del mondo, il miglior esercito… Miliardi investiti in ogni genere di protezioni che dovevano impedire le incursioni sotterranee del passato recente. Tanti progressi tecnologici, telecamere sofisticate a disposizione di abili soldati e soldatesse, in grado di individuare ogni possibile attacco del nemico.

Nelle ultime settimane le discussioni su un possibile attacco di Hamas sono state dominate da due questioni chiave: Hamas esprimeva un interesse crescente per il miglioramento della situazione economica nella Striscia di Gaza, mentre cercava di assicurarsi un posto nella difficile questione di un accordo tra Arabia Saudita e Israele favorito dagli Stati uniti. Per la leadership israeliana questa sarebbe la «pace» ideale: insieme all’Arabia saudita e ad alcune concessioni poco rilevanti ai palestinesi, non solo poter ottenere una presunta pace regionale, ma anche garantire la sopravvivenza del vergognoso governo di Netanyahu e dei suoi alleati di estrema destra.

E i palestinesi? Beh, per loro un po’ più di soldi da parte dei sauditi e del Qatar. E chi parteciperebbe ai negoziati? Abu Mazen, l’Olp, Hamas? Hamas nei negoziati? E l’influenza dell’Iran?

La «sorpresa» della guerra del 1973 è ancora oggi oggetto di discussione. I commentatori più esperti ci promettono che l’enorme sorpresa di oggi dovrà essere attentamente studiata. Sì, ma rimane la questione essenziale: il paradigma dominante. I migliori servizi segreti, il migliore esercito, quando ancora oggi si celebra una concezione basata sull’occupazione dei palestinesi, sul terrore di Stato, e noi che «siamo i più morali», e gli altri che esercitano un «terrore disumano».

Un popolo che sottomette un altro popolo non può essere libero e la barbarie della leadership israeliana non ci porterà mai a un miglioramento della situazione. Nei prossimi giorni le forze armate israeliane cercheranno di «cancellare l’affronto», mentre gli ostaggi israeliani saranno, forse, l’unico freno possibile alla furia di domani.

As thousands of rockets rain down on Israel, lighting up the skyline of Tel Aviv and other cities, the country’s current priority is to defend its towns and military bases against Hamas’s sudden and devastating attacks from the Gaza Strip. Israel will try to root out the militants, prevent more infiltrators, and silence the rockets and mortars bombarding its people.

Given the scale of Hamas’s attacks and Israel’s surprise, none of these tasks will be easy. And even if Israel succeeds, it faces difficult choices on what to do next to ensure that Hamas is weakened and that such an attack does not recur. Israeli leaders need to reestablish deterrence against Hamas and other adversaries while preventing the spread of violence to the West Bank, protecting the country’s recent diplomatic gains, and managing an ongoing hostage situation.

THE GAZA DILEMMA

Perhaps the biggest question is what to do about the Gaza Strip. Since Hamas seized power in this Palestinian exclave in 2007, Israel has avoided large-scale, sustained ground operations there, despite calls by Israeli politicians for action during past crises. Indeed, in 2018, Israel’s defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, resigned in protest when Israel negotiated a truce with Hamas. Israeli military leaders, however, rightly pointed out that trying to uproot Hamas from the Gaza Strip would be difficult. Hamas has deep ties there, running hospitals, mosques, schools, and youth groups, as well as the police.

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Before the latest round of fighting, Israeli leaders could argue that occasional airstrikes and economic pressure kept Hamas off-balance, unable to pose a major threat to Israel. That argument will now hold little weight. Israel could continue to rain down fire on the Gaza Strip, but that would do little to shake Hamas’s hold on power. In addition, although international (and especially U.S.) opinion is now sympathetic to Israel, each day of bombing that passes without any major response from Hamas would erode international support for Israeli Defense Force operations.

In the short term, Israel could make some gains against Hamas by sending its military to occupy all or part of the Gaza Strip. By entering it, Israeli forces would disrupt Hamas’s control of the population. They could interrogate area Palestinians, arrest Hamas officials at all levels, and otherwise gain information. They could also kill or capture large numbers of lower-level Hamas members, destroy tunnels and caches of military materiel, and disrupt infiltration routes from the strip into Israel. All these steps would weaken Hamas and reduce the short-term threat to Israel.

But even if it succeeds at weakening Hamas, a ground incursion carries major risks. The area’s dense urban terrain poses a significant obstacle to Israeli ground forces and creates enormous potential for civilian casualties. The 2014 crisis, for example, resulted in the deaths of 66 Israeli soldiers, six Israeli civilians, and well over 2,000 Palestinians (mostly civilians), despite the fact that Israeli forces penetrated only a few miles into the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge. Hamas has also dug tunnels in much of the territory, and it could use these to orchestrate sudden attacks and take more Israeli soldiers hostage—turning the current political disaster into an even bigger nightmare.

A return to anything approaching the status quo ante would look like a victory for Hamas.

Israel might also be able to supplant Hamas’s influence in the longer term if it could find other Palestinians to administer the Gaza Strip. But Israel lacks a credible political partner on the Palestinian side. Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, and his henchmen loathe Hamas, and they have brutally repressed it on the West Bank, but they lack significant political support among Palestinians. Widespread corruption, an aging and out-of-touch leadership, and years of collaboration with Israel have discredited the PA. What’s more, the PA leaders do not want to take power in the Gaza Strip by riding in on Israeli tanks, which would wipe out what little nationalist credentials they have left. All this means that a ground invasion that overthrows Hamas would leave Israel stuck administering the strip, forced to deal with its difficult economic situation and hostile population.

A long war in the Gaza Strip would also prove diplomatically disruptive for Israel. Israel is seeking to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, and it was hoping that Riyadh would ask for only token concessions on the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia’s leadership might have taken such an approach when Palestine was on the back burner, hoping that public opinion in their own countries and the broader Muslim world would focus on other concerns. With violence raging, however, Saudi Arabia could not afford to look weak on this issue. A statement issued Saturday by the Saudi foreign ministry presages increased diplomatic troubles, blaming the current explosion of violence on Israel’s “continued occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights, and the repetition of systematic provocations against its sanctities.”

Yet for all these problems, Israeli leaders might still feel compelled to go in. The scale of this attack is so immense that a return to anything approaching the status quo ante would look like a victory for Hamas. Israeli politicians have a history of short-term thinking, and popular passions are riding high.

ALL QUIET ON THE WEST BANK

Israel will also seek to ensure that the West Bank remains relatively calm, especially if it mounts a ground incursion into Gaza. Previous Israeli military operations in the strip prompted large demonstrations in the West Bank. The West Bank is already in turmoil, with talk of a Third Intifada erupting. In both 2021 and 2022, the territory experienced high levels of violence, and 2023 is on track to be even worse, with nearly 200 Palestinians dying by Israeli hands there so far this year. Part of this uptick in violence is due to the weakness of the PA, but the expansion of Israeli settlements and the repeated pogroms carried out by their residents against ordinary Palestinians have added tremendously to the tension.

The violence emanating from the Hamas attacks from the Gaza Strip and the Israeli response adds fuel to the flames. Hamas’s success offers inspiration to already angry Palestinians, showing that they can make Israel pay a price. Even more important, the Israeli response will involve large numbers of Palestinian deaths (around 200 have died so far, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry, and the number will surely climb higher). This new round of violence will inflame Palestinian sentiment, even if Israelis and much of the international community believe that Hamas started the conflict. 

Further frustrating Israel’s response is the problem of hostages. No one knows how many hostages Hamas has taken (and it may seize still more as long as its operatives are active), but Hamas claims it has taken “dozens.” Some of them might be smuggled back to Gaza, whereas others may be held by Palestinian militants in Israel itself. The hostages give Hamas tremendous leverage and represent a nightmare for Israeli leaders. Although Israel’s special operations forces are highly skilled, even small mistakes can lead to the death of many innocents in a raid gone awry. Hostage-taking also results in an ongoing drama—“theater,” as the terrorism expert Brian Jenkins once put it—that keeps the issue on the front pages of newspapers, with terrified hostages, frightened families, and a sympathetic public all demanding action.

The hostages also complicate military operations. At a strategic level, Hamas can threaten the lives of hostages if Israel goes into the Gaza Strip or otherwise threatens Hamas’s hold on power. At a tactical level, the possible presence of Israeli hostages in buildings in the territory or in the hands of fighters makes operations far more difficult, as the risk of killing Israeli civilians or military personnel will be present in every Israeli military operation.

RESTORING DETERRENCE

One of the biggest challenges for Israel will be how to restore deterrence—convincing Hamas and other enemies that they should not attack Israel again because the price they would pay would be too high—and how to do so in a way that is morally acceptable and ensures the support of other countries, especially the United States. Israeli officials will worry that a soft response to the current violence would encourage Hamas to strike again, and they will also be concerned that Hezbollah, Iran, and other foes would see Israel as weak.

The principle of proportionality in international law demands that Israel avoid excessive casualties and otherwise moderate its military response to focus on stopping the threat from Hamas. The logic of deterrence, on the other hand, often involves disproportionate casualties on the Palestinian side. Because Israel is highly sensitive to casualties, an equal exchange of deaths is, in Israeli eyes, a loss for their country. Indeed, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other so-called resistance groups pride themselves on being able to sacrifice more than Israel, believing the Jewish state is a “spider web” that appears strong from a distance but in reality is fragile. By this logic, deterrence requires casualty levels so high that even Hamas is daunted by them.

For deterrence to work in the long term, Hamas needs other options to maintain its political legitimacy, which rests on its opposition to Israel. Deterrence involves only dissuading an adversary from doing a hostile action it might otherwise do. But if the adversary believes that it has no choice, then deterrence is far harder. In theory, Israel could give Hamas more freedom to govern the Gaza Strip and offer it a greater role in Palestinian politics. These concessions might make Hamas even stronger, however, and a wrathful Israel is less likely than ever to be willing to take such chances.

Il 7 ottobre il mondo si è svegliato con la notizia di una vera e propria insurrezione del popolo palestinese ben coordinata che ha completamente colto di sorpresa, demolendolo, il mito degli apparati di sicurezza e di spionaggio israeliani. Ma ha colto di sorpresa anche il resto il mondo, sia quello più ostile che quello più sensibile alla causa palestinese.

Il governo israeliano, i mass media e le cancellerie occidentali – le uniche ancora una volta schierate con Israele – hanno parlato di guerra. Alcuni aspetti dell’azione militare palestinese sono indubbiamente di carattere bellico ma il contesto appare più quello di una insurrezione popolare contro una pluridecennale e brutale occupazione israeliana che di una guerra tra eserciti convenzionali.

Quella tra palestinesi e israeliani non è mai stata una guerra simmetrica. La sproporzione di forze è stata sempre pesantissima, il bilancio delle vittime civili è sempre stato asimmetrico a sfavore dei palestinesi.

Lo stesso atteggiamento della cosiddetta comunità internazionale – troppe volte ritenuta limitata a Stati Uniti ed Unione Europea – non è mai stato equidistante o simmetrico tra le ragioni dei palestinesi e quelle di Israele. Al contrario è ricorso sistematicamente ai “due pesi e due misure”, liquidando tutti gli impegni formali presi nei decenni dalle Nazioni Unite verso il popolo palestinese e sostenendo esclusivamente e ossessivamente la supremazia della sicurezza e dell’espansione coloniale israeliana.

Solo la miopia occidentale e l’arroganza israeliana potevano ritenere che questo arbitrio consolidato e ripetuto per decenni non potesse prima o poi avere ripercussioni.

La Resistenza palestinese ha utilizzato emblematicamente la data del cinquantesima anniversario della guerra del Kippur nel 1973 per scatenare una insurrezione popolare a Gaza, in Cisgiordania e perfino nei Territori Palestinesi occupati dal 1948.

Il 1973 fu uno spartiacque per la storia del mondo capitalista occidentale e dei suoi satelliti. La guerra lampo di alcuni paesi arabi contro Israele prevalse in un prima fase ma fu poi sconfitta grazie al sostegno militare statunitense alle forze armate israeliane. Testimonianze significative, come quella del generale e politico israeliano Moshe Dayan, affermano che Israele era pronta a ricorrere alle sue armi nucleari stoccate nel sito di Dimona per fermare l’offensiva militare di Siria ed Egitto.

Ma di fronte al sostegno occidentale ed europeo a Israele, i paesi arabi produttori di petrolio dichiararono nel 1973 l’embargo sulle esportazioni scatenando la più profonda crisi economica del capitalismo occidentale, dalla quale – sostanzialmente – non si è più sollevato nonostante la controffensiva liberista avviata dagli anni ‘80.

Cinquanta anni dopo, le organizzazioni della Resistenza palestinese, dopo tre decenni di massacri, occupazione militare, oppressione coloniale, bombardamenti devastanti e la cui contabilità di morti farebbe impallidire qualsiasi persona di buon senso, ha dato vita alla terza insurrezione dopo le due Intifade precedenti (fine anni Ottanta e primi anni del Duemila).

Nonostante la pervasività dello spionaggio e dell’intelligence israeliane, nonostante la brutalità dei raid militari contro le comunità palestinesi a Gaza e Cisgiordania, nonostante l’asfissiante controllo militare israeliano, i palestinesi hanno colto di sorpresa tutti gli apparati di Israele con una azione militare coordinata che ne ha demolito il mito dell’invincibilità e l’ossessione della sicurezza.

I palestinesi a Gaza, in Cisgiordania, a Gerusalemme, nei Territori Occupati dal 1948 e nei campi profughi della diaspora sanno benissimo che la reazione militare israeliana sarà violentissima e, molto probabilmente, l’hanno messo in conto da tempo.

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Ma sono anni ormai che i palestinesi gridano al mondo che l’unico modo per esistere e vedersi riconoscere i propri diritti è quello di resistere. Lo hanno pacificamente con il Somud, lo hanno fatto militarmente con al Mukawama, lo hanno fatto con le pietre e con marce pacifiche mitragliate dai cecchini israeliani, pagando un prezzo in vite umane, prigionieri, mutilati che pochi paesi hanno pagato negli anni più recenti.

Adesso il mondo ha subito un brusco risveglio e la comunità internazionale dovrà dire e fare molto di più che dichiarazioni di circostanza e ulteriore complicità con Israele. Ed anche la sinistra italiana ed europea dovrebbero smettere di balbettare banalità e obsoleti luoghi comuni sulla questione palestinese. Tutti avremmo preferito sentir gridare agli insorti “Palestina libera” invece di invocazioni ad Allah, ma se questo sono contesto e forze in campo sarà bene cominciare a fare i conti con la realtà, riconoscendola invece di esorcizzarla o temerla.

Anche perché il mondo è cambiato rapidamente in questi ultimissimi anni. Il doppio standard utilizzato da Usa e Ue per agire nelle relazioni internazionali è diventato insopportabile a gran parte del mondo.

Ragione per cui sulla questione palestinese è tempo di impegni sostanziali nel riconoscimento dei diritti storici e di quelli attuali. L’insurrezione palestinese, seppur con caratteristiche simili ma diverse da quelle di una guerra convenzionale, ha posto il problema sul piatto, anche con il rischio che si scateni un conflitto regionale di dimensioni inedite rispetto a quelli precedenti.

L’insurrezione palestinese ha mandato un avviso di garanzia, sia alle autorità israeliane sia al mondo arabo, a quelle statunitensi ed a quelle europee. Il tempo dell’ipocrisia è definitivamente finito.

On the morning of Saturday, October 7, the Palestinian group Hamas carried out a surprise attack on Israel on an unprecedented scale: firing thousands of rockets, infiltrating militants into Israeli territory, and taking an unknown number of hostages. At least 100 Israelis have died, and at least 1,400 have been wounded; Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that his country was “at war.” As Israeli forces responded, around 200 Palestinians were killed and around 1,600 wounded.

For insight into what this means for Israel, the Palestinians, and the region, Foreign Affairs turned to Martin Indyk, the Lowy Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-Middle East Diplomacy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Indyk has twice served as U.S. ambassador to Israel, first from 1995 to 1997 and again from 2000 to 2001. He also served as U.S. President Barack Obama’s special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations from 2013 to 2014. Earlier, he served as special assistant to President Bill Clinton and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, and as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs in the U.S. Department of State. Indyk spoke with Executive Editor Justin Vogt on Saturday afternoon. The conversation below has been edited for length and clarity.

A number of observers have remarked that today’s events have had an impact on Israelis similar to the effect the 9/11 attacks had on Americans. But Israelis have endured a great deal of violence in recent decades—as, of course, have Palestinians. What sets this apart?

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This was a total system failure on Israel’s part. The Israelis are accustomed to being able to know exactly what the Palestinians are doing, in detail, from their sophisticated means of spying. They built a very expensive wall between Gaza and the communities on the Israeli side of the border. They had been confident that Hamas was deterred from launching a major attack: they wouldn’t dare, because they would get crushed, because the Palestinians would turn against Hamas for causing another war. And the Israelis believed that Hamas was in a different mode now: focused on a long-term cease-fire in which each side benefited from a live-and-let-live arrangement. Some 19,000 Palestinian workers were going into Israel every day from Gaza, and that was benefiting the economy and was generating tax revenues.

But it turns out that was all a massive deception. And so people are in shock—and, like on 9/11, there is this sense of, “How is it possible that a ragtag band of terrorists could pull this off? How is it possible they could beat the mighty Israeli intelligence community and the mighty Israeli Defense Forces?” And we don’t have good answers yet, but I’m sure part of the reason was hubris—an Israeli belief that sheer force could deter Hamas, and that Israel did not have to address the long-term problems.

Why would Hamas choose to carry out this particular kind of attack right now? What was the strategic logic?

I can only speculate—I’m still in shock, quite honestly. But I think you have to consider the context at this moment. The Arab world is coming to terms with Israel. Saudi Arabia is talking about normalizing relations with Israel. As part of that potential deal, the United States is pressing Israel to make concessions to the Palestinian Authority—Hamas’s enemy. So this was an opportunity for Hamas and its Iranian backers to disrupt the whole process, which I think in retrospect was deeply threatening to both of them. I don’t think that Hamas follows dictation from Iran, but I do think they act in coordination, and they had a common interest in disrupting the progress that was underway and that was gaining a lot of support among Arab populations. The idea was to embarrass those Arab leaders who have made peace with Israel, or who might do so, and to prove that Hamas and Iran are the ones who are able to inflict military defeat on Israel.

There are talks going on regarding a peace deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and conversations about U.S. security guarantees for Saudi Arabia. In all likelihood, a primary motivation for Hamas and Iran was a desire to disrupt that deal, because it threatened to isolate them. And this was a very good way to destroy its prospects, at least in the near term. Once the Palestinian issue returns to front and center, and Arabs around the Middle East are watching American weapons in Israeli hands killing large numbers of Palestinians, that will ignite a very strong reaction. And leaders such as [Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince] Mohammed bin Salman will be very reluctant to stand up to that kind of opposition. Doing so would require him to stand up and tell his people, “This is not the way. My way will get the Palestinians much more than the way of Hamas, which only brings misery.” That kind of courage is, I think, too much to expect of any Arab leader in this kind of crisis.

What options exist now for the Israeli government?

Well, they’ve been through this five times before, and there’s a clear playbook. They mobilize the army, they attack from the air, they inflict damage on Gaza. They try to decapitate the Hamas leadership. And if that doesn’t work in terms of getting Hamas to stop firing rockets and enter into negotiations to release the hostages, then I think we’re looking at a full-scale Israeli invasion of Gaza.

This was a total system failure on Israel’s part.

Now that presents two problems. One is that Israel would be fighting in densely populated areas, and the international outcry against civilian casualties that Israel would inflict with its high-tech American weapons would shift condemnation onto the United States and Israel, and put pressure on Israel to stop. The second problem is, if Israel succeeds in a full-scale war, they then own Gaza, and they have to answer the questions: How are we going to get out? When do we withdraw? Whom do we withdraw in favor of? Remember, the Israelis already withdrew from Gaza in 2005, and they do not want to go back in.

You’ve known and dealt with Netanyahu on a personal and professional level for decades. What course do you expect he’ll choose?

Well, the first thing to know is that he prides himself on his caution when it comes to war. He’s very careful not to launch full-scale wars. So I think his first preference will be to use the air force to try to inflict enough punishment on Hamas that they will agree to a cease-fire and then a negotiation for the return of the hostages. In other words, a return to the status quo ante: that’s what he’ll be trying to get, trying to use the United States, Egypt, and Qatar to influence Hamas to stop. If that doesn’t work, and I doubt it will, then he’s got to look at other options.

Why do you doubt that will work?

Because I fear that Hamas’s intention is to get Israel to retaliate massively and have the conflict escalate: a West Bank uprising, Hezbollah attacks, a revolt in Jerusalem.

So in other words, Hamas will not play along with any Israeli response that aims to restore the status quo ante?

Right. And in terms of escalation, the party to watch most closely is Hezbollah. If the Palestinian death toll rises, Hezbollah will be tempted to join the fray. They have 150,000 rockets they can rain down on Israel’s main cities, and that will lead to an all-out war not just in Gaza but in Lebanon, too. And everybody would get dragged in that situation.

I fear that Hamas’s intention is to get Israel to retaliate massively.

On the other side, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the countries that signed the Abraham Accords with Israel—the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain—all have an interest in calming things down and getting a cease-fire, because the longer this goes on, the harder it will be for them to maintain their relations with Israel.

Will the current political instability in Israel affect decision-making there?

I think all of that falls by the wayside for now. This is a deep crisis of yet-unknown proportions. And the prime minister is facing a real problem, not only in defending the citizens, but in avoiding blame for what happened. And I don’t see how he can. So he’s got to find a way to redeem himself through the conflict. He cannot afford to have the extremist, far-right members of his coalition dictate what happens, because they will take Israel into a very bad place. So either he has got to exercise control over them, which he hasn’t been able to do yet, or he’s going to have to remove them. [Yair] Lapid, the leader of the opposition, today offered to join a narrow emergency government, which would include Netanyahu’s Likud party, Lapid’s party, and the party of [opposition leader] Benny Gantz. Netanyahu might just take that as a way of sidelining the extremists, showing responsibility, and bringing the country together.

It’s remarkable that this is happening 50 years, almost to the day, after the surprise Arab attack on Israel that launched the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

It is remarkable—and it is no coincidence. Let’s remember that, for the Arabs, the Yom Kippur war was seen as a victory. Egypt and Syria succeeded in taking the Israeli military by surprise, succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal and advancing on the Golan Heights, to the point where many Israelis thought Israel was finished. And so even though, in the end, Israel prevailed in that war, the victory of the first days is still celebrated in the Arab world. So for Hamas to show, 50 years later, that it can do the same thing—that is a huge boost to its standing in the Arab world, and a huge challenge to those countries and leaders that have made place with Israel in the preceding 50 years. And it’s worth pointing out that Hamas is a very different adversary. In 1973, [Egyptian President] Anwar Sadat went to war with Israel in order to make peace with Israel. Hamas has launched a war to destroy Israel—or to do its best to weaken it, to take it down a peg. Hamas doesn’t have any interest in making peace with Israel.

It was hubris that led the Israelis to believe, in 1973, that they were unbeatable, that they were the superpower in the Middle East, that they no longer needed to pay attention to Egyptian and Syrian concerns because they were so powerful. That same hubris has manifested itself again in recent years, even as many people told the Israelis that the situation with the Palestinians was unsustainable. They thought the problem was under control. But now all their assumptions have been blown up, just like they were in 1973. And they’re going to have to come to terms with that.